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CANCELLATION OF LAND CONTRACTS
BY JAMES E. LEAHY*
Among the judicial remedies found in Title 32 of the NDRC
1943, is the one covering cancellation of land contracts. Chapter
32-18 of the code sets forth a procedure which a vendor may
follow to terminate such a contract. This procedure, however, is
not exclusive. Courts of equity have always had the power to can-
cel contracts for the sale of land, and as was pointed out in the
case of Nelson v. McCue,' ". . . the method of cancellation pro-
vided by statute is merely cumulative and concurrent; . . ."2
Should a vendor elect to secure a cancellation of the contract
by action, and not under the statutory method, several remedies
are available to him. He may sue for cancellation and request
the court to determine the amount due and set the time that the
vendee may have to cure the default.' He may bring an action
of foreclosure and request that the amount due to be determined,
and that the property be sold at a judicial sale and the proceeds
applied on the judgment.4 If the vendor so desires, he may bring
an action to quiet title under Chapter 32-17 of the code and
have the contract removed as a cloud on his title.'
It will be the purpose of this article to discuss each of the
various methods separately, and to point out as far as possible,
the requirements which must be met in order for a vendor to
effect a legal cancellation of a contract for deed. The vendee's
rights of rescission or specific performance will not be discussed.
CANCELLATION BY STATUTORY METHOD
The statutory method of cancellation of land contracts came
into being by virtue of Chapter 204 of the Session Laws of 1903.
Basically this method is unchanged, with the exception that the
time allowed to cure the default has been extended from 30 days'
to one year,7 after the service of the notice of cancellation. Pro-
* A member of the firm of Cupler, Tenneson, Serkland & Leahy, Fargo, North Dakota.
1. 37 N. D. 183, 163 N.W. 724 (1917).
2. Ibid.
3. Vail v. Evesmith, 62 N. D. 99, 241 N.W. 719 (1932); Raad v. Grant, 43 N. D.
546, 169 N.W. 588 (1918).
4. Vail v. Evesmith, supra note 3; D. S. B. Johnson Land Co. v. Whipple, 60 N. D.
334, 234 N.W. 59 (1931).
5. Fyten v. Cummins, 52 N. D. 445, 203 N.W. 178 (1925); Fargusson v. Talcott, 7
N. D. 183, 73 N.W. 207 (1897).
6. N. D. Sess. Laws 1903, c. 204, §4.
7. N. D. Rev. Code §32-1804 (1943).
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visions have also been added for recording the notice8 and for
bringing the matter into court upon an affidavit of the vendee that
he has a legal counter claim or valid defense against the vendor.9
NOTICE
Once a default has occurred and a vendor decides to cancel
the contract by the statutory method, he must give written notice to
the vendee or his assigns. 10 In Williams v. Corey," our court
held that "assigns" means, . . vendees of the purchaser when
known to the vendor, ... " and further, that a purchaser from
a vendee is entitled to the statutory notice even though the
contract contained a provision against assignment without the
written consent of the vendor. The court held that such a pro-
vision in the contract is collateral to the main purpose and can
be waived by the vendor.
The notice must state that a default has occurred and that
the contract will be cancelled or terminated upon the expiration
of one year from the service of the notice. 12 It must be served
in the same manner as provided for service of a summons in
the district court, if the person upon whom service is to be made
is a resident.'" The notice can be published if the vendee or
his assignee is a non-resident or cannot be found in North Da-
kota. A sheriff's return of not found, is prima facie evidence
that the vendee cannot be located or is a non-resident
14
Although the statutes do not prescribe a form of notice
to be used, our court has given some indication of what the
notice should contain. For example, in Glein v. Miller,"5 the court
held that where there was no acceleration clause in the contract,
the notice was defective for attempting to declare the entire
balance due. Thus a notice to be valid, must only contain a de-
mand for payment of the amount of the default, where the
contract does not contain an acceleration clause. In the case of
E. J. Lander & Co. v. Deemy," the notice stated the default which
had occurred, and the amount due on the contract. It also stated
that the plaintiff had elected to cancel and terminate the contract
8. N. D. Rev. Code §32-1805 (1943).
9. N. D. Rev. Code §32-1806 (1943).
10.-N. D. Rev. Code §32-1801, 32-1802 (1943).
11. 21 N. D. 509, 131 N.W. 457 (1911).
12. N. D. Rev. Code §32-1802 (1943).
13. N. D. Rev. Code §32-1803 (1943).
14. N. D. Rev. Code §32-1803 (1943) (Must be published three times).
15. 45 N. D. 1, 176 N.W. 113 (1920).
16. 46 N. D. 237, 176 N.W. 922 (1920).
CANCELLATION OF LAND CONTRACTS
and that such cancellation would take effect 30 days after the
service upon the vendee. The vendee made no effort to cure the
default and the court therefore held that contract was effectively
cancelled.
The notice prescribed by this statute is absolutely necessary,
where the cancellation is sought by the statutory method. The
parties cannot even contract against it."7 Notice is not necessary,
however, where the cancellation is sought by an action at law
or in equity. 8 Nor is notice required where there has been an
abandonment of the contract by the vendee."
The code does not state when the notice must be given.
Can a vendor, therefore, wait as long as he likes, after default,
leaving the matter in status quo, and later give an effective notice?
Long before the enactment of the statutory procedure for can-
cellation, it was established in this state, that "When a party
stipulates that he will give written notice of his election to take
advantage of a breach, where time is of the essence of the
agreement, an unreasonable delay in giving this notice is equiva-
lent to an assurance that as to that default the provision with
respect to time has been waived."
2 0
This rule is so well established in this state, that the writer is
of the opinion that it applies to the statutory method of cancella-
tion in the same manner as it applied prior to the enactment of
that procedure. Thus, if the vendor does not give timely notice,
after learning of a default he may have waived his right to a
cancellation, at least as to that default. Our court gives that
implication in Duffy v. Egeland.
2
TIME TO CURE DEFAULT
After the notice has been served upon the vendee, he has
one year in which to correct the default,2 2 and the contract is not
cancelled but remains in force until the year has expired. 23 Should
the vendee have a counterclaim or a defense to the cancellation
of the contract, he or his attorney may present an affidavit to
that effect, to the judge of the district court in the county where
the property is situated, and that judge may direct that all further
17. N. D. Rev. Code §32-1804 (1943).
18. N. D. Rev. Code §32-1804 (1943); Raad v. Grant, 43 N. D. 546, 169 N.W. 588
(1918).
19. Harrington v. Eggen, 51 N. D. 87, 199 N.W. 447 (1924).
20. Fargusson v. Taleott, 7 N. D. 183, 73 N.W. 207 (1897).
21. 26 N. D. 135, 143 N.W. 350 (1913).
22. N. D. Rev. Code §32-1804 (1943).
23. Hammer v. Woodworth Elevator Co., 55 N. D. 449, 214 N.W. 251 (1927).
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proceedings be had in the district court.24 It is thus conceivable
that a vendee may wait 364 days and then present such an
affidavit to the court, and secure further time to cure the default.
Section 32-1806, NDRC 1943, however, states that the judge
"may enjoin" the cancellation, and "may direct" that all further
proceedings be had in the court. It would therefore seem that
the court is to be guided by equitable principles. And it it
would be unjust to allow further time to the vendee, the court
probably would not enjoin the cancellation.
MAKING RECORD OF CANCELLATION
Once the notice has been served and the one year period of
redemption has expired without the vendee curing the default,
the contract is cancelled and the vendee has no further interest
in the land. To make a record of the cancellation, a copy of the
notice, which was served upon the vendee, together with an affi-
davit of service, and an affidavit of the vendor or his assigns
may be put of record in the office of the register of deeds. The
affidavit of the vendor shall state that the default of the vendee
under the terms of the contract was not cured within one year
from the date of service of the notice.
2 5




Where a vendor desires to cancel a contract for deed, by
action, and merely terminate the interest of the vendee therein,
he may do so, and possibly secure speedier relief than by using
the statutory method. For example, in Ryan v. Bremnseth,27 the
action was to cancel a contract for deed. The lower court found
the vendee in default, but allowed him approximately one month
to cure the defaults, and that if he did not do so his interest
in the property would be at an end. Upon application of the
vendee the court extended the time another month. The defaults
were not cured and judgment was entered determining that
the vendee's interest was at an end. The vendee appealed. The
Supreme Court, in affirming the lower court held, (1) that no
24. N. D. Rev. Code §32-1806 (1943); Lee v. Jordan, 50 N. D. 365, 195 N.W. 660
(1923).
25. N. D. Rev. Code §32-1805 (1943).
26. The words "cancellation" and "foreclosure" are used interchangeably in the cases.
III this article, where the relief sought is merely a termination of the vendee's interest, the
term cancellation will be used. The term foreclosure will be used to describe an action
where the vendor seeks a judgment of foreclosure and a sale thereof.
27. 48 N. D. 710, 186 N.W. 818 (1922). '
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statutory written notice of intention to cancel the contract was
required in order to maintain the action, and (2) that the lower
court did not err in not granting a six months period of redemp-
tion as provided in the then existing statutory method of can-
cellation, and (3) that in this this method of cancellation, the
court would apply equitable principles. The court then allowed
the vendee further time to cure the defaults.
In this type of action, then, to cancel a contract, the result
is the same as that reached where the cancellation is sought
under the statute, except that it is possible to secure a shorter
period of redemption. Whether or not a shorter period will be
required of the vendee to redeem, will depend upon the facts and
as a general rule, the court will balance the equities in favor
of the vendee.
Another example of the balancing of equities, is the case of
People's State Bank of Hillsboro v. Steenson. "l 2' The lower court
granted a cancellation, but did not allow any time for redemption.
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's de-
cision as to the cancellation, but set up a method of redemption
that amounted almost to a re-writing of the contract.
Some statements in the cases of Jessen v. Pingel,"9 and Knowles
v. Older,;- are unfortunate as far the law of cancellation of land
contracts is concerned. While the lessen Case was not originally
one to cancel a land contract, the vendee's right of redemption
under such a contract was at issue and discussed by the court.
The court in referring to land contracts, states that what is now
Chapter 32-18 specifically provides against a "strict foreclosure."
This would seem to indicate that a strict cancellation without a
right of redemption could never be granted, and that the statu-
tory redemption period of one year would apply to actions brought
for that purpose. In the Knowles Case, also, even though that
was an action brought to cancel the contract, the court seems to
imply that the one year statutory redemption period applies.
The writer does not believe that our court intended to lay
down such a rule. In the lessen Case, the court goes on to point
out that under the statutes, the vendee has one year to cure the
default, ". . . unless an action is commenced for such purpose . . ."
meaning of course, an action for the purpose of cancellation. Thus
the court indicates that the redemption period is not controlled
28. 49 N. D. 100, 190 N.W..74 (1922).
29. 65 N. D. 209, 257 N.W. 2 (1934).
30. 57 N. D. 128, 220 N.W. 625 (1928).
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by the statute, when cancellation is sought by action. The case
of Funderburg et al v. Young, et al,31 supports this conclusion.
In that case our court wrote this syllabus:
"3. Where the vendee in a land contract has been in
default since 1925 and all of the payments provided in
the contract are long past due, payments for the past sev-
eral years being negligible, and no offer to pay any definite
substantial sum is made; no equitable showing is presented
which would preclude the court from terminating the
contract upon failure of the vendee to make good the
default within thirty years."
See also the case of Breher v. Hase,3 where in the court specifical-
ly stated that the then existing statute, giving six months to redeem,
does not apply to cancellation by action.
Where cancellation is sought by action, therefore, the equities
of the case are what govern the length of the redemption period.
ACTION TO FORECLOSE CONTRACT
As stated above, in footnote 26, in speaking of an action to
foreclose a land contract, the writer means that the action is simi-
lar to the foreclosure of a mortgage. The relief sought being a
judgment declaring the amount due, and for an order of sale
of the property to satisfy the judgment. That was the type of
action used in the case of D. S. B. Johnston Land Co. v. Whipple."
The trial court determined the amount due and ordered the land
sold. This procedure was approved by the Supreme Court, and
has been cited with approval in subsequent cases. 4
The Johnston Land Co. Case, supra, has been overuled on
one point, and that is with regard to the allowance of a deficiency
judgment against the vendee. Such an allowance was upheld in
that case. However, as the court points out in Schaff v. Kennelly,35
a deficiency judgment may not be allowed in an action to fore-
close a land contract, but must be sought in a separate action
brought under what is now Sections 32-1906 and 1907 of the
.1953 Supplement to the NDRC 1943.
Neither the Johnston Land Co. Case, nor the Schaff Case
states whether the vendee under the contract, was given any time
to redeem, after the foreclosure sale.36 It would seem, however,
31. 68 N. D. 481, 281 N.W. 87 (1938).
32. 54 N. D. 87, 208 N.W. 974 (1926).
33. 60 N. D. 334, 234 N.W. 59 (1931).
34. Schaff v. Kennelly, 61 N.W.2d 538 (N. D. 1953); Vail v. Evesmith 62 N. D. 99,
241 N.W. 719 (1932).
35. 61 N.W.2d 538 (N. D. 1953).
36. Upon inquiry the writer was informed that the judgment of foreclosure in the Schaff
Case, supra note 34, provided that the vendee have one year within which to redeem.
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that that is governed by Section 32-1906, which provides that in
an action to foreclose a mortgage or for the cancellation or fore-
closure of a land contract, the court shall have the power to
order the delivery of possession of the property to the foreclosure
sale purchaser, but not before the expiration of one year.
At first glance it would appear that Section 32-1906, as
amended, might also allow a period of one year to redeem in
an action where the relief sought is only a cancellation of the
contract, without a judgment and sale. The statute states, "In
any action for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage or the
cancellation or the foreclosure of a land contract, .... ", however
a close reading will reveal that it pertains only to those situations
where there has been a determination of the amount due and
judgment and sale ordered.
The phrase, ". . . or the cancellation or foreclosure of a land
contract ...... did not appear in the statute until it was amended
in 1937.17 The case of Funderburg et al v. Young, et al,"" was
decided after that date. That case was for a cancellation, and our
court approved a 30 day redemption period, pointing out that
in suits to cancel land contracts, the court must render such judg-
ment as the equities of the case require. Thus clearly indicating
that the court is not bound by any statutory redemption period.
It is therefore the opinion of the writer, that the one year
redemption period in Section 32-1906, does not apply, where the
vendor is seeking only a cancellation of the contract, and a return
of the property. Under those circumstances, the redemption period
is governed by the equities of the case.
It should be noted here, that the court in the Schaff Case, supra,
decided several other questions pertinent to the foreclosure of
land contracts. It held that no power of attorney is required
where the foreclosure is of a contract, nor is it necesary that a
notice before foreclosure be given prior to the commencement of
the action.
ACTIONS TO QUIET TITLE
The right to terminate a vendee's rights under a land contract
by an action to quiet title has long been recognized by our courts.
One of the earliest cases which allowed that remedy was Fargus-
son v. Talcott.39 In. that case, the court apparently weighed the
37. N. D. Sess. Laws 1937 c. 159.
38. 68 N. D. 481, 281 N.W. 87 (1938).
39. 7 N. D. 183, 73 N.W. 207 (1897).
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equities and ordered entry of judgment allowing the vendee 30
days to make good the defaults. If he did not do so, his interest as
vendee was to be terminated and the vendor given immediate
possession of the property.
When a vendor seeks to terminate the vendee's interest in a
land contract in an action to quiet title, the court will be guided by
equitable principles, as such an action is essentially an equitable
action.4" The period of redemption will depend upon the facts of
the case, and will be based upon the equities found to exist.
RECOVERY OF MONEY OR OTHER RELIEF
In some of the cases wherein the termination of the vendee's
interest is sought, the vendor has attempted to recover, not only
the land, but also a money judgment. For example, in Roney v.
Halvorsen Co.,4" the vendor by way of counterclaim, sought to re-
cover the purchase; price of the land after once having cancelled
the contract by notice. The Supreme Court pointed out that one
cannot adopt contradictory positions. Where a person has two
modes of redress, which are inconsistent, the assertion of one
precludes him from asserting the other. This rule has been ap-
proved in subsequent cases." Thus it is well settled in this state,
that the cancellation of the contract, by whatever method the
vendor desires to use, relieves the vendee from any further liability
for the unpaid portion of the purchase price.4
The above rule, of course, does not mean that a money judg-
ment can never by recovered in an action involving a land con-
tract. Where the contract is foreclosed, as was done in the John-
ston Land Co. Case and the Shaff Case,4 4 the court renders a money
judgment, and orders the land sold to satisfy it. No deficiency,
however, can be recovered except in the manner provided for in
Section 32-1906 and 1907, as amended.
In the case of Fyten v. Cunmmins,4 5 the vendor brought an
action to remove the contract as a cloud on her title. She also
sought a personal judgment against the Vendee for damages arising
out of a breach of certain covenants in the contract. These dam-
ages were not for any portion of the purchase price, but were for
40. Northwestern Mutual Savings and Loan Ass'n. v. Hanson, 72 N. D. 629, 10 N.W.2d
599 (1943).
41. 29 N. D. 13, 149 N.W. 688 (1914).
42. C. A. Finch Lumber Co. v. Weishaar, 55 N. D. 695, 215 N.W. 155 (1927);
Security State Bank v. Krach, 36 N. D. 115, 161 N.W. 568 (1917).
43. Vail v. Evesmith, 62 N. D. 99, 241 N.W. 719 (1932).
44. See subheading, "Actions to Foreclosure."
45. 52 N. D. 445, 203 N.W. 178 (1925).
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injuries to the premises and advancements made by the vendor.
The lower court allowed a cancellation of the contract and quieted
title in the vendor, and also rendered a personal judgment against
the vendee in excess of Six Thousand Dollars. On appeal the Su-
preme Court affirmed the part of the judgment relating to the
cancellation of the contract but struck from it the award for dam-
ages. The court in so doing, did not say that such a judgment
could not be rendered in such a case, but only held that it was
error not to determine the amount of the vendee's equity in the
land and credit that against the amount due the vendor. In other
words, if a money judgment for damages, is sought in addition to
a cancellation of the contract, then the amount of the vendee's
interest in the land must be determined and credited against the
amount found due to the vendor.
It should be noted that ordinarily where a contract is can-
celled by any of the methods herein discussed, no refund is allowed
the vendee for any part of the purchase price he has paid to the
vendor. The court in the Fyten Case, laid down a different rule
where the vendor seeks a money judgment for damages in addition
to the cancellation of the contract.
The case of Lee v. Jordan,4 illustrates, that the vendor may
secure other relief in an action to cancel a land contract. After the
service of the notice of cancellation by the vendor under the statu-
tory method, the vendee obtained an order from the district court
directing that further proceedings be had in that court. There-
after, the vendor started an action for cancellation and alleged,
among other things that the vendee was threatening to remove
buildings, and crops from the land. The vendor then requested an
order restraining the vendee from doing these acts. The vendor
also secured a temporary restraining order, from which the vendee
appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of the tem-
porary order.
SUMMARY
A vendor in this state has open to him four methods of pro-
cedure to cancel and terminate a land contract. He may proceed
by the statutory method as set forth in Chapter 32-18 of the code.
If he does, he must giye the required notice to the vendee or his
assigns. This method allows the vendee a minimum of one year in
which to cure the default.
46. 50 N. D. 365, 195 N.W. 660 (1923).
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A Vendor may secure speedier relief by bringing an action to
cancel, or an action to quiet title, in the District Court. In either
of these methods, the court can terminate the contract and will
allow a period of redemption in accordance with the equities that
the court finds to exist.
Should a vendor not want the property back, he may bring an
action of foreclosure, similar to that of a foreclosure of a mortgage
and secure a judgment and order of sale of the property. Under
this method the vendee will have one year to redeem from the
foreclosure sale and no deficiency judgment can be awarded against
him, except in accordance with the provisions of Sections 32-1906,
1907, NDRC 1943 as amended.
In some instances, a vendor may secure other relief in addition
to the cancellation of the contract. But if he asks for money dam-
ages for breach of any of the covenants in the contract, or for
advances made for taxes, etc., the vendee's equity in the land must
be credited against the amount of damages found due to the
vendor.
